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This is the text version of the author’s inaugural professorial lecture at Oxford 
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from the lecture as actually given. The latter can be watched, with the full range of 
slides deployed, at: 
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Introduction: have we really had enough of ‘experts’? 
 
Thank you very much. And thank you for coming tonight. I know that lots of you have 
travelled a long way to be here, and I appreciate it.  
 
When I started to think about this inaugural, there was only really one place to start, 
and it was with the theme of expertise – because arguments about that concept 
have been running rampant through our recent politics, and it is also a topic I’ve 
been writing about for the seventeen years since I became a University Lecturer in 
the winter of 2001/2002. So if you’ll allow me, I’ll try to address both ‘what experts 
can do for us’, and also, more widely, how we can make public policy in better ways… 
or, perhaps, we might all sometimes be forced to say, in ways that are slightly less 
bad.  
 
Our first point of reference here is of course now-Environment Secretary Michael 
Gove’s intervention in the European referendum campaign on 2 June 2016. Mr Gove, 
speaking for the eventually-successful Leave campaign, was faced with a long list of 
economists who said that leaving the European Union would harm Britain’s 
economy: he said in reply, and very simply, that we have all had enough of experts. It 
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is important to note, however, that he didn’t mean all experts: he specifically singled 
out all those acronym-heavy international thinktanks and regulators who’d got the 
Great Recession so wrong, who have not always had the best record of getting 
specific forward indicators right, who were easily traduced as out-of-touch elitists 
who preferred their financial models to what I suppose Mr Gove imagined as the raw 
get-up-and-go patriotism he wanted to encourage. And to a certain extent – to go 
against received academic wisdom – he was right. The result bore out his opinion. 
Many among the British people really had had enough of experts, or at least all those 
liberal metropolitans supposedly huddled together in London (and Oxford, and 
Cambridge), welcoming immigration, embracing change, jumping around Europe 
with their burgundy passports, feeling altogether at home in the new and the 
different. Well, Mr Gove showed them, didn’t he? 
 
In truth, none of this is Mr Gove’s fault. He’s a politician. He took advantage of the 
wind he felt at his back. His success is a symptom, not really a cause, of our present 
malaise. Long-term trends have weakened the bonds, not just between economists 
and academics and the public, but between all governors and all of the governed. For 
many reasons: a more complex society; a flood of information from all sides, making 
it hard to see who’s well-intentioned, let alone who’s right; the decline of deference; 
the rise of an adviser class who seem very, very distant from Brexit Britain; 
international organisations who seem accountable and beholden to no-one. There 
are lots of reasons.  
 
Britain’s public policy disasters 
 
To speak more specifically, one of these reasons is the list of acute public policy 
disasters that the British state has endured since 1945. We can divide these, fairly 
arbitrarily, into foreign policy debacles and domestic implosions. Here I should just 
say that when I mean policy failure, I mean those decisions that failed even in their 
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own terms, and over which there is little controversy. Most policies, of course, fall 
somewhere in the middle range between disaster and triumph, a situation I will 
address in a moment. 
 
But let me introduce you to three such failures, just to begin with: the devaluation of 
sterling in 1967; the Conservatives’ disastrous Community Charge, or Poll Tax, of the 
late 1990s; and another sterling devaluation, this time under a Conservative 
government in 1992. Let’s start with the first. In November 1967 Harold Wilson, 
Labour’s then-Prime Minister, had to admit to the nation that his pledge to hold 
sterling at the value of $2.80 had totally failed. The economic guiding light of 
Wilson’s first three years in office was gone. His assurance that the money ‘in your 
pocket or purse, or in your bank’ had not been devalued haunted him ever after. For 
a man who had always made his name as an economist, an expert statistician, this 
was a catastrophic reverse. For Wilson at least, it was never quite glad, confident 
morning again. Next: the Poll Tax. 31 March 1990 was the culmination of a period of 
civil disobedience protesting against the Conservative government of the time’s new 
flat-rate local government tax. 113 people were injured, and 339 were arrested, in an 
anti-Poll Tax riot in Trafalgar Square. The conflagration in central London that day 
came to stand as an image of how badly the tax had gone wrong. It took down an 
entire premiership, which had looked unassailable just a couple of years before; and 
it did permanent damage to the Conservatives’ ‘brand’, for many years up to this 
point stressing competence and results. Lastly, we have the coup de grace of that 
reputation for economic know-how: Norman Lamont on ‘Black Wednesday’ (16 
September 1992) having to announce another devaluation, this time a float 
(downwards) from its peg to the German currency of DM2.95. David Cameron lurked 
in the background as one of Lamont’s aides – not learning the lesson of touching the 
Europe issue at your peril. It was this single day that did more than anything else to 
bulldoze the Conservatives’ polling leads on the economy, and which led inexorably 




More people usually get hurt when foreign policy goes wrong. As Britain retreated 
from its world role in the second half of the twentieth century, and as it became a 
mid-ranking European power with only limited ability to strike outside its own 
region, the reach of its mistakes shortened alongside the good it could do. But their 
number was still some way above zero. Three more very serious policy disasters 
immediately spring to mind here: the Suez Crisis of 1956; the Argentinian invasion of 
the Falklands in 1982; and the Second Gulf War of 2003 and its aftermath. During the 
Suez Crisis a mixture of delay, American economic pressure and deep partisan 
divides at home brought an Anglo-French invasion of Egypt to secure the Canal that 
Egypt’s government had nationalised to an end. This did irreparable harm not only to 
the UK’s diplomatic position in the Middle East, but its reputation worldwide. In early 
April 1982, Argentinian forces subdued the small force of British Marines stationed 
on the Falklands and seized the islands in a coup de main. The British had withdrawn 
the ice patrol ship Endurance, and their wider 1981 Defence Review had also 
encouraged the view in Buenos Aires that the British would not fight for the islands. 
The Foreign Secretary of the day had to resign; without very strong and immediate 
(as well as successful) retaliatory action, there is at least the strong possibility that 
the Thatcher government might have collapsed. Lastly, of course, we have the 
intensely controversial British decision, in 2013, to invade Iraq as part of an 
American-led coalition. Although the initial drive to Baghdad was successful at least 
in its own terms, post-war reconstruction and nation-building were appallingly ill-
designed, with truly catastrophic consequences. The invasion ended up sparking a 
civil war within Iraq that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. Only a decade and a 
half later has Iraq come to look anything like a functioning nation-state, and the 






We already know a great deal about policy failure 
 
There is a thriving literature about policy failure, and this has spawned some classic 
books. The British planner Peter Hall’s absolutely essential Great Planning Disasters, 
published in 1980, analysed some set-piece failures – the Anglo-French supersonic 
airliners Concorde, for instance. Reflecting on these, Hall drew on the public choice 
and game theory literature of his time to recommend much more comprehensive 
forward planning of the whole context around any project: in that case of Concorde, 
soaring oil prices that might have been at least provided for in the development 
stages. Most importantly, Hall showed how citizens’ own expressed preferences 
might be taken account of, instead of being presented with a ‘take it or leave it’ 
approach based on what was assumed to be good for them (Hall, 1980).  
 
Butler, Adonis and Travers’ excellent 1994 work, Failure in British Government, 
focuses on the Poll Tax, showing in that case how a very limited roster of palatable 
choices can gradually funnel Ministers towards an end-point that they would 
certainly not have explicitly chosen in its own right. Local income or sales taxes were 
thought to be impracticable; continuing with a property rating system was seen as 
politically very dangerous if they eventually had to be maintained via a revaluation of 
each property it covered. That seemed only to leave a flat-rate personal tax – as it 
turned out, perhaps one of the most disastrous choices of all (Butler, Adonis and 
Travers, 1994). Richard Grossman’s 2013 study of nine economic policy debacles, 
simply entitled Wrong, singles out inherited but outdated ideological predispositions 
for particular blame in this field, whether it was Britain’s return to the Gold Standard 
in 1925 or the United States’ adoption of economic protectionism in 1930 
(Grossman, 2013).  
 
The best example of successful work in this field is actually Anthony King and Ivor 
Crewe’s The Blunders of our Governments, published in 2013: partly because it is so 
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comprehensive about successive UK governments’ poor performance in delivering 
large-scale projects in recent years (King and Crewe, 2013). King and Crewe stress 
the way in which confused competences and crossed wires at the top create a 
culture in which, although one Minister will usually have initiated any big project, 
delivery is usually diffuse, confused and poorly managed. That allows the real 
providers – whether they are policy entrepreneurs, IT companies, security companies 
or building contractors – to utilise their superior access to knowledge and take 
advantage of central government’s information deficit. Parliament is not usually able 
to push its way into any of these projects: moving too rapidly for anyone, Whitehall 
often simply ignores Westminster, and ends up in the inevitable blunders that a lack 
of accountability and oversight create. My own debt to King and Crewe will be very 
apparent in my remarks tonight. However, even superb work like theirs does not 
always succeed in creating a hierarchy of causation when it comes to governance 
failures – something which can hamper attempts to recommend priorities if we are 
attempting to navigate our way out of these systemic difficulties. 
 
What are the real limits to progress? 
 
In this lecture, I will without I hope too much presumption try to draw together some 
of the many threads that have often been left hanging, and identify some of the 
ways we can better analyse public policy if we are to move forward in slightly better 
order. By so doing, I hope to be able to resuscitate at least some of our faith in what 
we are doing – if not the past, and now properly neglected, reverence for ‘expertise’.  
 
My major themes will be the following. Any large-scale policy will involve hitherto 
unthought-of costs and spillovers. These all involve effects both near to and far from 
the policy field you were working in that are hard to track and trace, and which are 
then related to one another in more complex ways still. Harold Macmillan once 
compared this to a children’s puzzle in which you were able to insert two or three 
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balls, but the third or fourth then popped out. Thinking of policy like a Rubik’s cube 
might not be too far away from the mark.  
 
Guided by numbers that will almost always turn out to be wrong (as they were 
during the 1976 crisis over the UK’s loan from the International Monetary Fund), you 
will usually fall far short of your marks. You will not be able to do all the things that 
you thought you might, when you arrived as a bright-eyed and bushy-tailed Minister 
(or Prime Minister) on day one. You will get tired. Your senior civil servants will get 
tired. You will fail to understand some key briefings. You might doze off in a 
committee. You might fall ill. You may well become subject to one of those mild but 
performance-inhibiting middle-class pathologies, such as drinking slightly too much, 
on rather too many nights. Your mental health will probably suffer. And when you 
least expect it, a huge crisis will blow up during which you will say something stupid, 
and perhaps career-ending. For instance: in April 2018 the now-ex Home Secretary, 
Amber Rudd, ended up having to resign after telling a Parliamentary Committee that 
her department had no targets for deportations, when they clearly did – a tangle 
that has never been quite satisfactorily explained. All of this will slow progress, and 
perhaps derail it altogether.  
 
None of this means that we can’t move forward at all. Failing to understand 
everything does not mean that we cannot know anything. Missing targets does not 
mean that things cannot get better. Being tired and lacking support does not mean 
that the Cabinet cannot make decisions. The political science literature, and what 
historical examples we have before us, are both clear that policy failure and success 
should be seen on a wide spectrum, not as a binary, and that there are many things 
we can do to shift the dial away from the former, and towards the latter. In this 





The rule of unintended consequences 
 
There is not the time, in just one lecture, to go through all of these systems. Let me 
instead bear down on just one of the themes I just mentioned, buttressed by 
another: the rule of unintended consequences, made all the more prevalent by the 
transient, fragmentary nature of all our data. In a highly complex developed society, 
any meaningful intervention in the economic or social system will have knock-on 
effects that you were not expecting, sometimes emerging far from the problem you 
were addressing.  
 
Here are three examples of what I mean. I covered the first case study in my third 
book, Governing Post-War Britain, in 2012 (O’Hara, 2012). This is the case of Labour’s 
Land Commission, set up under Wilson’s 1964-70 government in order to reduce 
land prices – at the time, then as now, thought to be one key to the very steeply 
rising cost of housing. Labour’s idea was this: by taxing and then deploying itself 
some of the planned betterment value of land zoned for housing, the Commission 
would be able to build up large landbanks that it would then build on itself, or lease 
out to developers. The problem was simple. The relatively high rate of this charge, 
combined with a vociferous opposition to the idea led in Parliament by a young 
Margaret Thatcher, meant that developers banked even more land than they had 
already – waiting for the day when the official Opposition became the government. 
Combined with the inevitably very slow operation of an entirely new type of land 
tenure, and the administrative start-up costs of the Commission, that meant that the 
idea foundered very quickly in the midst of what effectively became a development 
strike by private builders.  
 
A more topical example is the rise of so-called ‘sugar taxes’ on products such as very 
high-sugar fizzy drinks. There is no doubt that reducing the intake of such drinks is 
very desirable from the point of view of health policy. But one recent study, applying 
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economic techniques to a database of 32,000 households in Great Britain during 
2012-13, has shown that increasing the price of highly sugared beverages might 
increase the demand for lager – not exactly what policymakers were aiming at 
(Quirmbach et al., 2018). Notably, this was mainly because middle income families 
increased their alcoholic purchases as very high sugar drinks rose in price: increasing 
the cost of rather less sugary drinks did not seem to have this effect. The authors 
quite rightly pose the puzzle of why this might be rather than settle on any one 
explanation, but the dilemmas involved in any policy initiative emerge very strongly 
from such data. Similar problematic tradeoffs are everywhere, even in just this one 
narrow field. Reducing consumers’ intake of sugary drinks will raise the amount of 
sweeteners in people’s diets, for one thing, while the effect of going too far towards 
‘encouraging’ healthy lifestyles might discourage citizens who find it hard to live in 
that manner. 
 
On top of all this, as the dilemmas of beverage policies demonstrate, is the problem 
of numbers – always an art in both construction and use, rather than a science. 
Another example arises from an article I wrote in 2004 for the journal Twentieth 
Century British History, in which I traced the panic that set in across Whitehall when 
the 1961 Census tabulation began to trickle in (O’Hara, 2004). A rising birth rate at 
that time implied that we would pass even our present population levels in the mid-
1970s, a development that would basically require the still relatively new welfare 
state into a massive emergency expansion. That didn’t happen – the second post-
Second World War birth boom abated nearly as quickly as it arose – but the 
implications for public policy, over and above any improvements, were stark. Nearly 
a million new dwellings and over 100,000 new teachers would have been needed just 
to stand still, with no abatement of the need for social care focused on the elderly to 




The main lesson here is simple: policy will always involve unintended consequences. 
Equipping yourself to see the suggestions of that already occurring should be part of 
all decision-making. As should the constant review of statistical demand, production 
and inference – a requirement that the Office for National Statistics is well aware of, 
but which is much more difficult in practice than it is in theory. 
 
Why should we listen to you anyway? 
 
You would be forgiven at this stage for asking: what allows historians to say any of 
this? What justifies their intervention? Part of the answer involves the possession of 
deep, rather than wide, knowledge – long and painstaking study in the archive, 
broadly defined, which allows historians just occasionally to come up for air and 
identify some general themes and answers. I’ve spent twenty years in those archives, 
and I’ve written four books about British public policy – first about economic, social 
and spatial planning (O’Hara, 2007), then about British maritime policy at its 
interface with seafaring identities (O’Hara, 2010), then as we have already seen 
about unintended consequences in post-1945 decision-making (O’Hara, 2012), and 
lastly about water policy (O’Hara, 2017) – covering even in just that last book 
disputes as broad and as narrow as decisions about cleaner rivers, safer beaches, 
flood defences, nationalisation, privatisation, rural water supply, and piping hot 
water into the domestic home.  
 
I think, hopefully, that I can also narrow in just a bit further than simple ‘knowledge’. 
In my own work, I’ve tried to mobilise the concept of historical institutionalism: a set 
of theories that hopefully allows us while explaining change to hold the ring between 
human agency, on the one hand, and deeper structural forces – economic, social, 
technological – on the other (Fioretos, Falleti and Sheingate, 2016). Politicians’ 
decisions still matter, at the summit: but institutions, their ongoing and very 
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powerful legacies, their structures, processes, codes, guidelines and cultures, form 
the boundaries, the ways of thinking and the shapes of choice around them.  
 
Analyse success, not just failure 
 
It is important to balance out my previous emphasis on policy failure this by saying 
that most UK public policies undertaken since the Second World War have not failed. 
In fact, they have for the most part succeeded – and aided by circumstance and 
change, succeeded for the most part beyond the wildest dreams of anyone in 1945. 
But far too much contemporary commentary is still couched in terms of crisis. The 
perennial difficulties of the National Health Service are a ‘crisis’. Moral panics about 
young people, crime and the city – often based on inadequate information or poor 
acquaintance with the situation on the ground – are ‘crises’. Splits within the 
governing party or the Opposition – however minor, however ephemeral – are 
granted the same overblown label.  
 
Several forces are at work here. First, a particular view of modern British history that 
my colleague Jim Tomlinson, of the University of Glasgow, has labelled ‘declinist’ 
(Tomlinson, 2009). One popular myth about Britain is that it has been in secular and 
perhaps inevitable decline since about the time of the First World War, falling behind 
newer Great Powers (particularly the United States). Its economy sclerotic, its 
workers inefficient, its infrastructure dated, British national life has been denigrated 
for a long time – since at least the late 1950s and 1960s, at which time it became 
fashionable to deploy the trope of Britain’s terminal decline or even ‘death’.  
 
Other notable trends are a deep nostalgia for an Edwardian ‘golden age’ of liberal 
progress, perhaps updated now to a yearning for those post-war years of both high 
economic growth and welfare spending – strangely, harking back to the very same 
era in which ‘declinism’ emerged. Then again, intergenerational politics are 
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important here, as the population gets older and older, and increasingly labels and 
pathologizes young people as if they are more of an objective set of problems than 
an age group.  
 
But we need to look at the reality behind these very familiar generalisations, since 
looking at what works is at least as important as analysing what does not. If we just 
start with life expectancy overall, it is clear that this very crude indicator of wellbeing 
has surged upwards – less rapidly since 1950 than between 1890 and the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War, but very quickly nonetheless. On the eve of the 
First World War, life expectancy at birth ran into the fifty-somethings for both men 
and women; by the post-war era, that number had moved into the sixties and 
seventies; it is now in the process of moving into people’s eighties. 
 
Clearly the fact that most of us are living longer has all sorts of reasons – lifestyle, 
diet, medical intervention and the like. But if we look at some more policy-orientated 
areas of people’s real lives where government intervention has had some effect, we 
can see that in the long run at least, governments have made an enormously positive 
contribution to national well-being. Deaths in the winter, mainly of course of older 
people, have been slashed by grants for home improvement, and (since a spike in the 
late 1990s) in part by winter fuel payments and attacks on pensioner poverty led by 
incomes-related Pension Credit topups to older people’s pensions. There is no doubt 
that public health campaigns on such matters as Sudden Infant Death Syndrome – or 
‘cot death’ as it was labelled in the 1980s – have helped cut infant mortality. Deaths 
on the road have been cut by seatbelt legislation, better regulation of car building 
standards, and government attacks on drink-driving. The risk of drowning – I wrote 
about this in The Politics of Water – has been cut by successive governments’ 
commitment to teaching swimming (in combination with the charitable sector), as 




There is no doubt that the British are healthier, wealthier, taller, longer-lived, safer, 
even on some measures and as far as we can tell happier than they have ever been 
before – a fact that we ignore at our cost. For what did all those government 
interventions do? They pushed with the grain. Double glazing, central heating, much 
better knowledge about the health of unborn and very young children, falling alcohol 
intake and (less positively) fewer children allowed out to play unsupervised were also 
behind all these trends. Governments were steering with the wind. Consider the case 
of Britain’s much cleaner rivers, to which life has been returning ever since they 
appeared completely dead, relatively starved for instance of the oxygen necessary 
for fish to thrive, in the 1960s. That was very clearly down to the cleanup that began 
in the 1980s: but it was also due to the decline of British manufacturing industry (as 
well as its haphazard move out of crowded urban areas), trends which hugely 
reduced the release of pollution into our rivers.  
 
Now, this is not to say that everything is proceeding handily in this best of all possible 
worlds. For one thing, note that the very rapid improvements in many of these 
indicators that we can see in the 1980s and 1990s – the years when I was growing up 
– have now slowed or stopped. The easy wins may be over: one more clue as to why 
we are experiencing such a very angry and unfocused politics at this time. Clearly our 
society continues to face grave challenges, and – right now – pressing needs. Just to 
take one among many: the rise of homelessness over the last few years has been as 
avoidable as it is tragic. The number of rough sleepers in England alone – 
representing just the tip of the iceberg when we look at this problem – has risen for 
every one of the last seven years, so that in 2017 it stood at 4,751 (Butler, 2018). But 
it is still important to make clear that public policy experts can both bring news of 
great success, and use that information all the better to analyse policy with. Just 
looking at failure will not work: telling the negative side of the story, full of errors or 
perhaps structural failings, cannot alone build up a really comprehensive picture of 




Focusing on ‘success’ and ‘failure’ is in any case probably far too stark, and much too 
binary. Most policies exist on the inevitable spectrum between outright disaster and 
complete satisfaction. Failures might happen at different levels, in different parts of 
the policy process, affecting the eventual shape of exact deficiency (McConnell, 
2010). Whether objectives get turned back as part of programme, process or politics 
– broadly, as part of design, implementation or partisan dispute – really matters, and 
we also have to analyse where in that chain the successes and failures are 
happening. Even when objectives are not met, many policy studies academics point 
to the different forms of learning (and therefore future success) that can take place 
about why governments’ tools fell short. 
 
Humility in a world of uncertainty  
 
That is not to say that ‘experts’ have all the answers. They certainly do not, and one 
of their manifold failings is to write in too definitive, and too one-dimensional, a 
manner. The struggle to be ‘relevant’ – and, latterly, to build up case-studies of their 
metricised social ‘Impact’ more broadly – has led academics to think about their 
intent and audience. But what it has also done is draw them into a world of outsized 
and technicolour comment. Added to their own tendency to seek an answer, or the 
answer, this has encouraged us all to write and speak in terms that do not make 
enough sustained use of one of our advantages, and one of our jobs: the injection of 
nuance, uncertainty and granular detail into the picture. 
 
Consider the UK General Election of 2017. One of the strands in my work up to now 
has been the analysis of data, including long-run trends using opinion polls and other 
political indicators, so I took a strong and public view of the situation at that time. 
Now, right up until three to four weeks before polling day, I would have confidently 
told you that Britain’s Labour Party was heading for a very bad defeat. You did not, 
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by the way, need to look at any opinion polls to reach that conclusion. Local and 
Parliamentary by-elections, canvassing data, focus group transcripts and the sheer 
weight of anecdote all pointed in exactly the same direction. But then, something 
very unusual happened. Labour leapt from its pitiful performance in the early May 
local elections to surmount 40 per cent of the popular vote in early June. They still 
lost, but they were not defeated in anything like the same manner predicted just 
weeks before. Why did this happen? There were at least three straws in the wind 
that we should have caught hold of. 
 
One: campaigns do now seem to matter. Going into the 2017 General Election, most 
commentators were confident that the short campaign of three to six weeks or so 
doesn’t really count. We were wrong. Labour surged, while the Liberal Democrats, 
Greens and UKIP sagged as the main Opposition party sucked up all the anti-
Conservative oxygen in the room. Now we should have been warned about that by 
the Canadian federal election of 2015, at which the Liberal Party led by Justin 
Trudeau not only put on a very similar vote share to Labour’s 2017 campaign gains, 
but came from third to first and added over 20 per cent and 150 seats to their 
disastrous showing at the previous election. Fortunately, I did note this at the time, 
wondering aloud in January 2016 whether we had ‘got it all wrong’ (O’Hara, 2016). 
But really that’s to avoid the real point here: in conditions where party attachment 
seem to be weakening all the time, sudden electoral surges should not be as 
surprising as they were. 
 
Two: the Leave electorate from 2016 did not constitute the General Election 
electorate. As we can see in work published by Matt Singh of Number Cruncher 
Politics, there was a very strong relationship between an increase in turnout and 
voting to leave the European Union in 2016 (Singh, 2016). Theresa May’s electoral 
gamble was that she could ride to an easy, even uncontested victory on the back of 
Leave voters who wanted to make sure that we did indeed leave the EU. But both 
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she, and we, should have been more cognisant of the risk that these voters simply 
would not turn out again – allowing Remain Britain, in the majority at the 2017 polls, 
to take their revenge on her. The demographic and ideological composition of the 
actual electorate, it is clear, can be just as important as the movement between 
parties. 
 
Three: we paid too much attention to headline Voting Intention numbers. Labour at 
their nadir, right at the start of the 2017 election campaign, returned some figures in 
the mid-20s. If they had stayed at that level, they would have been wiped out as a 
serious Parliamentary force that aspired to form a government. One other reason 
why that did not happen has to do with why their overall numbers were sagging. All 
data, as we have already noted, is a construct – in some ways art and judgement, as 
well as science. And what the main voting intention numbers were showing were 
that as many Labour voters in the raw data were saying that they did not know how 
they would vote as were saying that they would move over to the Conservatives and 
the Liberal Democrats – 19 per cent, as opposed to 20 per cent reporting a 
preference to change their vote (YouGov/ The Times, 2017). In the first stage of the 
campaign, as the Liberal Democrats in particular failed to fly, these voters returned 
home, pushing Labour back towards respectability and then into a zone where they 
could compete. We failed to look deeper than the headlines. That’s something else 
experts can do.  
 
It is far better to express all mixes of certainty and uncertainty, all projections in the 
near- or medium-term, as a range of probabilities or chances. The Bank of England 
does this in terms of its narrow-band or wider-band ‘heat maps’ of where inflation is 
likely to go, even without significant changes in policy or external shocks. More 
relevant in terms of the electoral example we have just been talking about is the 
American elections expert and statistician Nate Silver, who has made a career out of 
mostly very successful electoral forecasting. Many people seemed shocked when 
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Donald Trump was elected President of the United States in 2016, despite the fact 
that some of them had been feverishly updating Mr Silver’s 538.com website every 
few minutes for weeks. The very final update of his electoral model gave Donald 
Trump just under a thirty per cent chance of winning the Presidency (FiveThirtyEIght, 
2016). Many people seemed to think that thirty actually meant zero. But you would 
not, I guarantee, put a gun to your head with two barrels loaded and pull the trigger 
– an action that will be fatal in only a few more simulations (33 per cent as opposed 
to 29 per cent). Mr Silver was proved right, in his battle with those experts who gave 
Mr Trump a far, far smaller chance of winning: but the fact that his message often 
wasn’t getting through anyway speaks to our difficulty in understanding what’s being 
said to us in numbers, as much as it does about the failings of ‘experts’. Even so, even 
he could only flag the danger. He could not provide precise certainty as to its size. 
 
We’re not at Hogwarts any more (and we’re not in History Today either) 
 
So, in this example as in others, we must accept strict limits as to what ‘experts’ can 
aspire to achieve. Politicians and civil servants have never, and will never, be able to 
take on board everything that public policy experts – historians among them – might 
be shouting about from outside Whitehall and Westminster’s rather dense walls. 
They don’t have time to do so, even if they had the inclination to listen. And, in any 
case, the efficacy of specific recommendations is very questionable. As A.J.P. Taylor 
once famously observed, politicians learn only ‘from the mistakes of the past how to 
make new ones’ (Taylor, 1963). One recent example: British politicians shied away 
from intervening in Syria’s terrible civil war, in part because of their awful experience 
in post-Saddam Iraq. It is at least arguable that they were wrong to do so. And so on. 
 
Recent social and cultural changes also make Professors’ views even less likely to 
stick. The Hogwartsian University, that disseminates information from eccentric 
dons, or moves esoteric knowledge around in the sense that it takes it from over 
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here, in the academy, and plugs it in over there, in your heads, was always something 
of a myth. The History Professors created by David Baddiel and Rob Newman for 
their Mary Whitehouse Experience television programme (1990-92), beloved of those 
born into shall we say a certain generation, were funny because they were 
grotesque. But grotesques have to reference some form of truth to be funny at all, 
and there was enough sharp observation in Baddiel and Newman’s caricature to 
force the point about portentous and pretentious Professors.  
 
All that seems increasingly old-fashioned now. The time has passed – and it has well 
passed, properly passed, if not quite declared done with – during which straight, 
white, staid, English, Oxbridge-educated, middle aged white men get to tell you what 
to do. That is unquestionably both a positive and a welcome reality. All we can do – if 
we can even do that – is advise and warn others as to their speed and line of march. 
In that spirit, I am now going to outline, in no particular order, six different themes or 
recommendations that I believe could assist in the administration of public life, and 
in reducing the number of public policy disasters.  
 
Recommendation one: better legislation, more slowly 
 
Firstly, we should at least make further progress towards treating legislation as an 
ordered, thoughtful, deliberative and above all restrained process. Not in the sense 
that it adheres to some non-existent world in which wise and all-seeing public 
guardians decide our future – I’ll have more to say about this in a moment – but at 
least in a move towards making fewer, and better, laws. Since the 1980s, Ministers 
have been obsessed with delivering something, almost anything, as long as it looks 
like change. The compulsion is general, but its acceleration can be dated quite 
specifically. Mrs Thatcher demanded ‘solutions’, and not problems, be brought to 
her. The creation of executive bodies and spin-out agencies focused attention, 
welcome perhaps at first, on ‘deliverables’. The transfer of some powers to the 
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European Union, and to the private sector given privatisation, helped to focus UK 
Ministers’ minds on what they did control. These were for the most part public 
services – and, following in the late 1990s and early 2000s, even that measure of 
responsibility shrank to England alone. For all these reasons, legislating and 
‘reforming’ became a key indicator in itself for Ministers’ competence and likely 
promotion. There were far too many Criminal Justice Acts. Far too many Education 
Acts. Far too much change for change’s sake. 
 
It would be more useful to treat Parliament, at least in normal times, as an 
investigative body, a backstop and an arbiter rather than as an enabling all-purpose 
excuse or cover for huge omnibus laws that can’t possibly be scrutinised under our 
present system. Let me give you three examples of what I mean. Firstly, as the late, 
great Tony King suggested in his short (but indispensable) Pelican book Who Governs 
Britain?, the composition of the MP teams who vet legislation in detail could be 
reformed (King, 2015). The expert Select Committees who oversee the work of each 
Department become more powerful all the time: yet the same lessons have not been 
read properly over into the Public Bill Committees that look at each law in embryo. 
Although many Bill Committees do contain plenty of MPs with some experience of 
each topic, it is too much to expect our MPs to equip themselves to look at projected 
legislation, in any field, every time the Government wants to act. Most Select 
Committees cannot usually be expected to take on this work themselves: they would 
become too overloaded. But a bespoke approach, that allowed those that do not 
handle very much legislation (as in foreign affairs) might sometimes take on some of 
this work. Limited numbers of Select Committees’ members – or past members – 
should be able to move across and around committees in each specialist field, 
perhaps providing mentoring and leadership to other MPs just starting out in each 
area. Much more training and continuous Professional Development, and a reduction 
of the party Whips’ role in the process of Bill Committee selection, would assist. 
Bolstering the construction of formal panels of Members with likeminded interests 
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and outside experience would help. In this way a bank of actual expertise could be 
built up – a limited, pragmatic but effective reform that is capable of rapid 
implementation.   
 
Next, the House of Lords should be taken more seriously as a revising chamber. 
Again, simple one-size-fits-all solutions are not necessarily the best or right ones. 
Upper Chamber reform does not necessarily mean that its membership should be 
transformed, still less that it should become a Senate of the Nations and Regions, as 
many in the Labour Party propose. That may desirable in the medium term. But more 
important here are that House’s functions, and the extent to which it is taken 
seriously. The present government has very lightly staffed its Front Bench in the 
Lords, and appears to want to threaten and bully that chamber at every possible 
stage – hence the strange spectacle of the Prime Minister sitting, as an observer and 
as an implicit threat, while the Upper House considered Britain’s Article 50 
notification to leave the European Union. The reform of the Lords’ membership 
should go hand-in-hand with more weighty though tightly-drawn powers, and a 
consequent rise in Ministers’ consequential presence there.  
 
Lastly, MPs still do not have enough resources to staff an office properly. They are 
probably not paid enough (a statement that I am aware will never be popular). But 
their office allowances are simply not enough to build up a real team of experts in 
the field they chose to monitor as a matter of their own particular interest. In short: 
Parliament should be both more serious, and taken more seriously.  
 
Recommendation two: throw away your drafts 
 
Many of the public policy debacles I have mentioned have occurred because 
Ministers simply cannot admit defeat. Take the example of the Conservatives’ 
Community Charge, or Poll Tax, in the late 1980s. It became clear, fairly early on in 
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the Tax’s implementation phase, that all was not well with the scheme. The 
Department in charge, and its Ministers – significantly including Chris Patten and 
Michael Portillo from both the Left and the Right of the governing party – signalled to 
Downing Street rather early on that it simply would not work. But they met with 
comprehensive resistance when they tried to take their case to Prime Minister and 
Cabinet. Making everyone pay the same charge – except students and the 
unemployed – held a superficial kind of attraction for the Conservatives of the time. 
The core of the scheme was an attempt to avoid ratings revaluation adjusting how 
each house was treated for the local property tax or ‘rates’, always politically 
explosive, as well as an effort to end the perceived injustice of smaller households 
paying the same, related to the value of their house, as larger families. There was 
also the intent – close to Mrs Thatcher’s heart – to force Labour councils to be more 
thrifty once every voter could see the impact of local authority spending on their 
individual bank balance. Promoting individualism; helping elderly voters who had 
saved up for their retirement; hurting Labour: it all offered a kind of superficial logic. 
The only alternatives on the table – a reformed property tax, a business charge, a 
local income tax – clearly did not meet all these preconceived objectives. So on 
Ministers steamed, straight into a very large crisis.  
 
They had not reckoned with implementation being very, very difficult – or with the 
scheme’s inherent logical flaws. For one thing, councils administering the Poll Tax 
simply could not see into each household, especially in the privately rented sector, 
where individuals with very difficult circumstances might be living. Not only that, but 
tens of thousands of people now simply disappeared from the electoral register, 
hiding from a tax they had no intention of paying. Extraordinarily, in the end four 
million people eventually refused to pay the Charge, in whole or in part, and £5bn 
simply had to be written off. The Poll Tax could not carry the moral weight that any 
tax must lift: namely, to be seen as fair, transparent, well-designed, equally borne by 
all in some relation to their ability. Worst of all politically, Labour councils could 
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simply blame Conservative central government as the individual cost of the tax rose 
and rose between drawing board and doormat. It failed both the test of efficiency 
and the test of equity.  
 
Initial experience in Scotland, where the Poll Tax was notoriously first implemented, 
should have alerted Ministers to the dangers. The responsible Department actually 
did. The Treasury under Nigel Lawson was very sceptical. Yet the Government 
ploughed on regardless. Why? Because the whole effort became a kind of virility test, 
a masochism strategy long before Tony Blair coined that phrase, a totem to rightness 
(and Rightness) long after most of its intellectual props had been kicked away. It was 
the single most important reason why the Thatcher government lost its way, and it 
helped to bring a dominant and over-mighty Prime Minister down.  
 
Actually, admitting that you are wrong might work better. Consider Theresa May’s 
absurd assertion that ‘nothing had changed’ following her Dementia Tax u-turn 
during the 2017 General Election. Nothing did more to burn the surface off the 
planet of her credibility. Nothing could have been easier to avoid, even after the 
disastrous unheralded policy had been allowed to creep out. All she had to say was ‘I 
have listened and learned, I am responsible, I have thought and considered, I have 
changed my mind’. Voters are crying out for a little bit of honesty. Not too much, as 
Mrs May’s outbreak of frankness over social care’s likely costs proved. But at least a 
measure of it. Governments should give it to them.  
 
Recommendation three: take the long view… and co-operate 
 
There are only a limited number of policy crises that really fix and hold the attention 
for a very long time. Suez was followed by rapprochement with the Americans. 
Exiting the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992 put Britain on course fairly 
rapidly towards a long period of non-inflationary growth, underpinned by a more 
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transparent and more effective monetary policy. Even so, the issues to which a long-
run approach must be taken are multiplying and becoming more important, both in 
terms of social equity and the financial costs of error. Experts – and especially 
historians – can bring the very broad outlook of the long-distance runner to bear on 
these questions.  
 
Consider the problems now before us. Why has British productivity growth been so 
weak since the beginning of the Great Recession? How are we to pay for the 
population’s ageing, at least until greater numbers of workers gradually come on-
stream during the 2030s? What about the crisis in private pensions, so vividly 
summed up by the crisis over universities’ own USS scheme? How are we going to 
fund the huge increase in total student numbers that now lies ahead, given the rise 
in the birth rate during the early twenty-first century? How and on what financial 
basis can we update the UK’s pitifully child-like physical infrastructure? I would 
contend that in all these cases much, much more than a single government’s 
endeavours are in play.  
 
One good example is the state of the social care sector, now deep in crisis in many 
parts of the country. Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Theresa May have now all 
tried to pay for much more generous provision, via various forms of deferred 
inheritance tax – charges that are likely to fall on citizens only after their death, when 
they are unlikely to mind very much that they are rather less wealthy, on better-off 
Britons (because it will be their houses that will be charged), and on younger voters’ 
unearned inheritances. These efforts have for the most part been defeated by 
partisan opposition, first from the Conservatives in 2010, and then by Labour in 
2017.  
 
Timidity has also played a role, particularly in Mr Cameron’s case, but the deep 
partisan divisions that now scar the landscape of our national life are threatening to 
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destroy rational public policy. It need not be like this. Both parties were committed 
to university expansion in the early 1960s. Both accepted Britain’s membership of 
the European Union from the mid-1980s onwards. Social care is a good example of a 
policy that will only really be solved by the two main parties agreeing on at least 
some common ground. There must be a way to tax older, wealthier Britons, to make 
sure that the young – already very hard pressed – do not have to meet very 
uncertain and potentially very high costs for their parents in their old age. There 
must be a way to cap the liability of those older Britons who need prolonged help, 
either at home or in some form of sheltered care. There must be a way of sharing the 
cost between the state, the individual and the family. But our only chance of getting 
there from here is for the parties to agree that this most intractable and sensitive 
subject, touching both on most people’s only source of capital (their house), and 
their long-term infirmity, is treated like adults would treat it: by agreement. I am 
afraid that I am not holding my breath.  
 
Recommendation four: keep testing yourself, keep doubling back  
 
Good policy is not made in one direction. It is certainly not made in straight lines. I 
think that our traditional models – how we think about the making of laws, for 
instance – has long been superseded. But that hasn’t quite crept its way into all 
policymakers’ minds yet. The old story runs something like this. Civic society in some 
way diagnoses some form of economic or social problem. Trade unions, parties, think 
tanks, academics and the like transmit that to Parliament and Government. 
Government resolves to do something about that problem. It passes legislation. That 
legislation is subject to controversy and amendment, but measures of some form are 
eventually passed. Then Government monitors those measures for their efficacy, 
before we start the whole loop again, with the institutions standing between 
government and ‘society’ – in inverted commas – also reporting back on what 




But actual government certainly does not work like that. There isn’t a feedback loop 
that exists in one time and in one place. The policy space might much better be 
imagined as a set of jigsaws leaning against each other. I first began to think seriously 
about this issue when I read Jose Harris’s classic 1970s book Unemployment and 
Politics: A Study of English Social Policy, 1886-1914 (Harris, 1972). What Professor 
Harris showed there was that it is the administration of policies that can come first – 
that it can be the new legislation that can create the raw data that drags 
governments into new fields, new arenas. It is only then followed by all sorts of other 
policy actors catching up with government, constantly cross-checking with Ministers 
and officials about the results flowing from any new machinery or monitoring. The 
feedback loop, in its turn, does not happen (and indeed should not happen) at the 
end of any process, but continuously during its lifetime – something that saved 
Universal Credit from complete collapse during its so-called ‘reset’ phase in 2013-14. 
Had Ministers waited until nearer the end of any implementation phase, the disaster 
that Universal Credit had by that stage become would have been much, much worse. 
 
So the key idea here is: continuously check your workings, all the better (as I noted 
under point two) to throw them away. Just a tiny pinprick of detail here: recently, 
the city of Bristol’s troubled Metrobus system tested its first buses along the 
specialised guided busways that the city has built, at some expense. They didn’t fit. 
The tolerances or likely size bandings of both the tracks and the guiding wheels on 
the bus came in at the extreme ends of the scale. So – back to the drawing board, as 
with so many elements of so many public transport schemes in the UK. Constant 
testing, in the laboratory, as well as in the building phase, might not have avoided 
this: but it would have increased the chances of reducing the delays involved. So just 
as GCSE and A-Level candidates are told ‘keep testing yourself’ – keep replicating 
your main points and ideas, keep reformulating them to answer different questions, 
26 
 
all the while deepening the impression they are making in your memory – all policy 
should be constantly tested at clear signposts, rather than during implementation.  
 
Recommendation five: embrace chaos 
 
There is, by the way, another reason why governance doesn’t conform to the 
classical nostrums that we once found in textbooks. It is much messier, more chaotic, 
more contingent. I think of this as the BBC’s chaotic and satirical political situation 
comedy The Thick of It in action, but with less swearing: as that show’s cynical and 
emblematic spin doctor Malcolm Tucker’s worldview made flesh. For those of you 
who don’t know, his motto is really ‘if someone can mess up, they will’ – though the 
actual quote is rather longer. In social science terms, governments ‘puzzle’ as well as 
‘powering’. They are forced to inch forward into a maze full of fog, for all the reasons 
I’ve outlined. Experts differ. Statistics are wrong. We pass too many laws, to which 
we then become politically over-committed. We do not have enough cross-party 
working. We think that we can assess policy when it’s ‘working’ (or not working), 
when in fact that is far too late.  
 
But these inevitable hallmarks of governing at all need not cause us to lose 
confidence. In fact, accepting all this could make government rather better. For one 
thing, voters are I think ready for Ministers who say ‘I am not sure’, ‘I don’t know’, or 
‘I have changed my mind now things are clearer’. Not too much, not too often, but 
sometimes. Secondly, accepting this level of uncertainty, this amount of constant 
movement, could well encourage all the ways of governing that I have been talking 
about. If we understood more clearly just how uncertain things are, we would pass 
fewer laws to try to control everything that comes at us, like some frenetic (and 
unsuccessful) game of Whack-A-Mole. We would subject our interventions to more 
constant testing. And we would listen to other people’s point of view rather more. 
27 
 
Such an outlook, lastly, would also allow Ministers to give up power, as well as 
greedily keep hold of it – to which topic I now turn.  
 
Recommendation six: cascading devolution 
 
This brings me to my last, and perhaps most concrete, recommendation. And that is 
massive, continuing dynamic devolution across the United Kingdom. Scotland now 
has an enormous range of devolved powers, a situation which is likely now to remain 
a concrete and unmoveable part of our constitutional landscape. The Welsh 
governance situation is evolving, albeit slowly. The situation in Northern Ireland is at 
present very worrying, with the main parties unlikely to share power any time soon – 
though long-term trends, and the desire to actually make a difference in Northern 
Ireland itself, may one day force their hands. Across England, our governance 
structures are far too centralised, far too cramped, much too rigid. The ‘Northern 
Powerhouse’ of Conservative Chancellor George Osborne’s imagination between 
2010 and 2016 often stayed just that – imaginative, but a slogan rather than a reality. 
The election of metro mayors in many of England’s cities, or of Police Commissioners, 
have completely failed to capture the public imagination (though directly-elected city 
mayors have done rather better).  
 
What this means is that some big cities’ infrastructure is, frankly, pathetic. The 
aforementioned city of Bristol has almost no public transport system worthy of the 
name. Neither does, for instance, Leeds. The gains to civic pride, increases in urban 
legibility, guidance to land values and development, efficiency increases for 
businesses, increased tourism – all ignored in battles between different jurisdictions, 
and a simple failure to capture enough power as well as puzzlement. England’s city 
regions need an entirely new deal, with massive and hitherto supposedly impossible 
transfers of power to mayors and councils: including the ability to borrow much 
more, and to experiment with social and welfare services on a much grander scale. 
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The gains that Manchester is already making on all these fronts should stand as an 
(insufficient) example here.  
 
Britain’s physical structures, and transport systems, are a backward, near-childlike 
and bad joke compared to those enjoyed by many of our competitors. Being able to 
raise bonds to pay for better urban planning could unlock much of the potential of 
England outside London that is at present neglected. It might allow for bold 
experimentation in terms of localised policies – something that the United States for 
instance, though often excoriated by European social democrats, already enjoys. It 
might allow local authorities to co-operate with each other, without reference to 
Whitehall at all: the West-East axis between Liverpool and Hull, which has the 
potential if planned correctly to rival Birmingham, London and the Central Belt of 
Scotland, might particularly benefit. Such a plan might also allow us to see rather 
better what works at this level. For all these reasons a huge and ongoing programme 
of permanent devolution across the UK, but particularly in England, is more than 
pressing. 
 
Teachers are their own lessons… and thank you 
 
At this point, I want to break off for a moment and talk in a more personal manner.  I 
think that you are usually allowed to do this in your inaugural, though I also hope to 
make some ‘thanks yous’ do some serious analytical work. I want to make an even 
wider point here than I’ve already been pressing – about the attitudes and beliefs 
demonstrated to me, among others, by the example of my teachers. That is far more 
important, as methodology, ethic, even aesthetic, than the narrow ‘lessons’ that we 
are also on the surface apparently engaged in. 
 
Most people’s first teachers are their parents, so I’m going to start there and run 
through chronologically. My mother has been the best guide to what you should and 
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shouldn’t do that I could have wished. The core skill she has, and which has I hope 
been in at least some part transmitted to me, is the art of just pressing on – even 
when things are not easy. I remember, at the time of some particularly egregious 
reverse, looking up at her (and it must have been early on, because it’s been many 
years since I looked up at her) and asking: ‘what do we do now?’ And the answer was 
the same then as I am sure it would be now: ‘we will just keep going’. For that skill 
above skills, which has enabled the others, I want to say something very simple, 
which most of us should probably say more, if we can, while we can: thank you, 
mum.  
 
Next, my schoolteachers – my A-Level History tutors, Jon Cook and Martin Cross. It’s 
hard to overstate the very humanistic, and very kind, lessons these two men 
provided me with when I was first trying to grapple with this academic subject, and 
their contribution to my basic formulations of why things happen in the first place. 
As two very different men, I think that they complemented each other very well. Jon 
helped me see just how important laying the groundwork for any work at all really is. 
What are your theoretical and methodological presumptions? How are they 
ordered? What are the most important, and the least? Which evidence supports 
them, and which challenges them? Schoolteaching is hard – harder than teaching in 
Higher Education – and he made those basic building blocks look very easy. Martin 
was completely different. I suspect that he would ask, were he to write an A-Level 
textbook: what do you believe? What are your gut instincts? Most of all, how do you 
feel? ‘Well, then’, he might say: ‘follow that’. Together, this was a jigsaw that all 
came together for me. I owe them both immeasurably.  
 
As an undergraduate at Oxford, I was tutored with enormous aplomb and skill by 
Jesus College’s two History Fellows of the time in the early 1990s: Niall Ferguson and 
Felicity Heal, though burdened by administrative and other duties of which I am only 
now fully aware, granted me so much time, and I suspect so much patience, that 
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they reformulated once again how I understood the craft of History itself. Niall and I 
clashed over politics from the very beginning – and certainly there was almost 
nothing on which we agreed. But what we did agree on was the light that could be 
shed on public policy by the study of History. He challenged me and my (what I 
thought was) sophisticated Marxism from every angle, relentlessly – from Left, Right, 
Centre, top to bottom – and I got used to the mental gymnastics involved in fending 
off the attack. That can be a trap, granting some graduates in this country a mastery 
only of the glib answer. Tested by Niall, I do not think that was the case, because his 
insistence on the links through from the theories you have in your head, to the 
evidence, to the implications now, examined mercilessly the links between all of 
them. 
 
Felicity provided an antidote, just as Jon and Martin did to one another. Being sent 
back, again and again and again, to the interstitial spaces between people’s public 
and private identities, and to the gaps within and between arguments, was a 
meticulous training in what it is to be a historian in the first place. On the surface, 
this was a less directly confrontational approach than that of many of my other 
tutors. But I came to realise that it was even more profoundly respectful of, and 
constructive with, myself and other students – because it suggested, probed, 
explored the argument. I was then, and I remain, profoundly in her debt.  
 
My PhD supervisor, Kathleen Burk, was I think it is fair to say a hard taskmaster. ‘Do 
it again’ is somewhere and everywhere written on my academic consciousness. Or 
perhaps ‘seared’ is the term. Like many PhD students, I had a great deal to do at the 
same time as my Research Degree. But I wanted to rush through things, and Kathy 
stopped me. There was some ruthless editing, some bruising commentary. All of it 
was right. You have to slow down to do really good academic work (though no-one 
has ever slowed the formidable Professor Burk down very much). Kathy showed me 
how to do that, pulling each chapter to pieces again and again, and reformulating it 
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in line with the overarching argument that I couldn’t yet reach. I can hear her when I 
supervise my own students, and although I cannot match the wide-ranging sweep 
and international scale of her writing, I hope I can help them just a fraction of how 
much she helped me.  
 
It is traditional on these occasions to say that we stand on the shoulders of giants. 
Well, that’s a cliché. I don’t want to say that. My own debt to my teachers is much, 
much more important than that, and calls for a rather more significant – and fresher 
– tribute. The type of research I’ve been talking about tonight has not just been 
assisted by them. In a very real sense, it is them. Every sentence, every argument, 
every lead, every bit of narrative, every calculation, every graph, every chart, every 
table, every turn of phrase – it’s them. It’s all them. The faults, I must say, remain 
entirely my own.  
 
This is important methodologically. Because the skills and values passed to me by my 
teachers, and that academics and other experts use every day, mirror and echo the 
kind of governance I’m talking about. Preparation. Rigorous testing. Meticulous 
examination. Thoughtful consideration, slowed right down to crawling speed if needs 
be. These are experts’ values. 
 
Anyone can take or leave individual policies. They come and go. I think that the 
example of great teachers – and you can probably all think of them in your own lives 
– is that they give you the tools both to start and finish the job. So, once again: thank 
you. There is no doubt that I am speaking up in your voice. I hope that I’ve caught at 







At least experts aren’t charlatans 
 
To sum up: there are six ways of both thinking and acting that might help us make 
public policy. Puzzle, rather than power. Delete your old drafts. Take the long view. 
Test, measure and test again. Accept uncertainty. Enable others. Such approaches 
are much more persuasive, I think, than that of our present political leaders. To 
single out just a few for special treatment, as a random and probably not particularly 
fair list: the Shadow Secretary of State for Justice (Richard Burgon), one of the most 
Eurosceptical Conservative Members of the European Parliament (Dan Hannan), the 
now-ex Foreign Secretary (Boris Johnson), and the Shadow Secretary of State for 
International Trade (Barry Gardiner).  
 
Now I am just putting forward these particular names as examples of two party 
leaderships that are currently trying to sell you two very unconvincing stories, which I 
might sum up as ‘Brexit versus train nationalisation’. But their views on all sorts of 
things might help me make a wider point. I am genuinely sorry to say this, but I 
cannot stress it enough: these people are charlatans. And none of them is worse 
than the charlatan-in-chief, the darkly comic character often known only as ‘Boris’ – 
a man so bent out of shape by political ambition that he makes a plumb-line look like 
a pretzel. Such people are willing to say blue is red, and red is blue. That up is down, 
and down is up. On public spending, on trade, on Brexit, on their own parties’ blind 
spots and prejudices, they seem to have no sense of shame itself. Whatever else 
experts are – academics, planners, educators, scientists, economists – they are not 
outright charlatans. That is a low bar, admittedly, but for the most part they handily 
clear it. Many of our political leaders do not. And though hard to quantify, it is 
unfortunately difficult to avoid the conclusion that this situation has got worse, not 




One reason for this is our increasingly bitter partisanship. If you take a look at social 
media maps of present party political competition, for instance those assembled by 
the think tank Demos over the course of the 2017 General Election campaign, they 
show a very clear clustering by party, with little engagement between each group, 
but also – just as worrying – that the engagement gets less the further away each 
cluster is from another. So there is a little engagement between social media 
accounts run by self-declared Conservative and Labour supporters, but almost none 
between (for instance) UKIP and Labour, and especially UKIP and the SNP. Now, UKIP 
were much less of an electoral presence in Scotland than elsewhere, so that will 
explain some of the differential, but the consequences for a Parliament that could 
well have contained a few UKIP MPs – and did contain 56 SNP MPs – could have been 
very rancorous indeed (Smith et al., 2017). 
 
Recent days have injected into our politics a poisonous tone of hatred that was not 
quite there before – or, at least, did not contain the air of threat, the tightened 
atmosphere, that has pertained since the tragic murder of the Batley and Spen MP, 
Jo Cox. Her motto, ‘more in common’, is today observed more as pious incantation 
than real insight. Instead, rival tribes of Left and Right roam the political landscape, 
meting out justice to those they deem insufficiently committed to their questionable 
cause. Their shared techniques reveal them to in fact share much more than they 
would like to admit. Delegitimisation of their opponents – especially their internal 
opponents. The fanning of social media fury. The deployment of anonymous swarms 
of trolls and bots. Loyalty tests. A semi-sponsored (but deniable) ‘new media’ of alt-
Right and alt-Left. A dark humour that dares others to draw the boundary between 
real statements and a self-knowing mocking set of poses. The employment of 





Here is the reality. Extremists of both Right and Left are trying to pull this country 
apart. Right now, they are succeeding: so much so that British politics looks like 
Humpty Dumpty, broken to bits at the bottom of his wall. In part this is because their 
approach is superficially attractive, but actually sunk deep in philosophical error, a 
set of misconceptions about our collective life that exists at two levels. The first is 
that they claim to have an answer – the answer. On the Right, Brexit will solve your 
problems. Unemployment? Low wages? Record levels of immigration? Over-
subscribed schools? Over-fishing? Let Brexit fix it for you. On the Left, the state will 
intervene. Your train is late? Your university is expensive? Social care is broken? Let 
the taxpayer fix it for you. I need hardly add that these approaches are likely to prove 
misleading.  
 
It’s not that they are necessarily incorrect, in detail. For instance: rail nationalisation 
probably would lead to some benefits emanating from the integration of services 
with track infrastructure. It’s that the Ministers and Shadow Ministers talking in this 
way seem unaware of the way policy is actually made, subject to all the constraints 
of time and thought and energy I hope I have begun to detail here. To perhaps 
unfairly pick on Labour’s plans: is the state really going to manage the backwash 
from Brexit, and nationalise much of the utilities sector, and completely reform 
England’s Higher Education system, and launch a new state-led infrastructure 
programme, and reach much more ambitious housing targets, and fund the National 
Health Service so that it meets all our needs, and save social care? The answer is no. 
Of course not. No Labour government could possibly hope to do those things – a 
prelude to another round of public disillusionment, further deepening our current 
political malaise. The most profound objection is not that these pronouncements are 
disingenuous, or likely to be inefficacious – though they are – but that they are 
morally wrong. Because it is wrong to offer people not only that which you know will 




Because such leaders aim, secondly, at certainty, at control – at timeless end-points 
that are desirable in and of themselves and that live in a kind of eschatological 
forever-present, both millennial and millenarian, final states privileged and rarefied 
as if they are principles to be exalted rather than tools to help people progress. 
Unfortunately, no such public policy end-point exists. 
 
Given these two very worrying trends in what might be termed the deep 
presumptions, the trigger motions and prejudices of those who seek to lead us – a 
fixation on certainty, and a focus on theoretical targets rather than paths towards 
actually better lives – it is hard to be optimistic about any set of recommendations 
today. Unless and until we ourselves, as voters and citizens, say ‘stop’, politicians will 
continue to act like this. Experts can warn all they want. Only politics – new demands 
on politicians to put their foot on the brake, before we become too divided – can 
effect actual change. It’s not about what I know. It’s about what you know.  
 
Conclusion: if only there were people who could help  
 
Experts can’t tell you what to do. But they can draw you a map, an aim that perhaps 
does not sound very ambitious, but may contain rather more hope than at first 
appears. To speak like a historian, for instance: we live at a very difficult time in our 
public life. But the long view tells us that things have been much worse, and also that 
they will very likely get better. It is not 1931. Our entire economic system is not 
teetering on the brink of dissolution. It is not 1940. Britain’s armed forces are not 
clinging to North-West Europe, betrayed by a near decade-long retreat in the face of 
the dictators. It is not 1976, with inflation surging and Britain forced to surrender its 
budgetary autonomy to the International Monetary Fund. It is not 1981, when a 
sado-monetarist drive towards inefficient so-called ‘efficiency’ wiped out a tranche 
of the UK’s manufacturing sector. Our situation was far more serious then, and we 
36 
 
recovered. All this can be done in a better way. We can put Humpty Dumpty back 
together again. 
 
Tonight I have suggested a handful of ways in which we can negotiate our way out of 
some of those systemic malfunctions. Legislate at caution, and slowly. Rip up what’s 
not working, rather than double down on your mistakes. Look ahead. Check your 
workings. Accept help, even from unlikely places. Embrace mess. Think. Analyse. 
Devolve. Because experts can at least sketch the alternative marching routes for both 
governments and voters. Tomorrow, like every other day, all sorts of people will get 
up and do just that. In universities, for instance, we will research, and write, and 
teach, and speak, and engage, and consult, as per usual. Maybe people should start 
listening a little more to the recommendations that are both implicit and explicit in 
universities’ work. It can’t hurt.   
 
Perhaps all this amounts just to an emphasis on process. On administration. But I 
would bet quite a lot on the following: it doesn’t seem like process if you’ve lived in 
the UK for half a century and you can’t get cancer treatment on the NHS. It doesn’t 
look like administration if the house your single mum rents is going to be taken away 
from you because your tax credits have been messed up, or if you’re that single mum 
and your kids are crying and you don’t know what to do. It’s not a matter of mere 
detail if your Personal Independent Payment assessors say you can work when you 
can’t walk out of your front door. It’s not a little thing if you’re eighty years old, and 
you need a hip replacement, and you need to take four buses to get to see your 
General Practitioner. It probably seems quite important. 
 
These recommendations might seem small. They aren’t. It is not ‘technocratic’ to 
insist that real people’s services and lives get better. It is not bloodless to focus on 
delivery. It is not any sort of ideals-light ‘centrism’ to believe that what you say you 
will do will actually get done. It does not speak to a lack of commitment, or care, or 
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passion, if you reject the divisive politics of social media crowding. On the contrary: 
all of that might be found at least near the heart of a better politics that people 
actually feel they recognise, they own and they like.  
 
Expertise can build both signposts and waymarkers. They can tell us all where we’ve 
been, and where we might be going. It can provide a link between the islands of 
what we know, and allow us at the same time to circumvent the ersatz or indeed 
false knowledge of what passes for our political leadership. Experts do not know 
much. But they can recommend how you travel along those some much-neglected, 
forgotten, overgrown – but far from hollow – ways.  
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